管理评论

›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 218-228.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于销售返利契约的低碳供应链协调策略研究

李友东1, 夏良杰2, 王锋正3   

  1. 1. 内蒙古财经大学工商管理学院, 呼和浩特 010070;
    2. 天津财经大学商学院, 天津 300222;
    3. 内蒙古大学经济管理学院, 呼和浩特 010021
  • 收稿日期:2016-06-23 出版日期:2018-09-28 发布日期:2018-09-29
  • 作者简介:李友东,内蒙古财经大学工商管理学院讲师,硕士生导师,博士;夏良杰,天津财经大学商学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;王锋正,内蒙古大学经济管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目（71502123；71563033）；内蒙古自然科学基金项目（2015MS0709）；内蒙古大学高层次人才引进科研启动项目（135144）。

Study on Low-carbon Supply Chain Coordination Strategy with Sales-rebate Contract

Li Youdong1, Xia Liangjie2, Wang Fengzheng3   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics, Hohhot 010070;
    2. School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot 010021
  • Received:2016-06-23 Online:2018-09-28 Published:2018-09-29

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摘要：

针对低碳供应链减排合作机制下的协调策略问题，引入销售返利机制，分别构建了制造商给消费者返利与收入共享契约、向下返利契约和制造商给消费者返利与减排成本分摊契约三种不同类型的契约模型，探讨在存在碳税和消费者低碳偏好情形下，销售返利契约对低碳供应链绩效的影响。假设在市场需求是线性的两阶段供应链中的制造商居于核心地位，运用博弈论模型，分别对所提出三种契约的有效性和灵活性进行分析研究。研究发现，在一定的条件下，制造商和零售商采用合适的协调契约形式可以获得更多的收益并能提高供应链的整体绩效，给出不同契约下双方的讨价还价空间并讨论了不同契约之间的相互关系。最后利用数值算例分析方法对结果进行了验证和说明。

关键词: 低碳供应链, 销售返利契约, 碳税, 供应链协调, 博弈论

Abstract:

Aiming at the cooperation strategy problem of enterprises' carbon emission reduction in low-carbon supply chain, we construct three different kinds of sales-rebate contract models namely sales-rebate and revenue sharing contract, downward sales-rebate contract, sales-rebate and reduction-emission cost sharing contract. This paper studies how the three types of sales-rebate contracts influence the performance of low-carbon supply chain under the circumstance of carbon tax and low carbon preference. Assuming the manufacturer is the core enterprise with linear demand, the paper analyzes effectiveness and flexibility of proposed contracts by game theory model. It is shown that under certain conditions both manufacturer and retailer can gain more profit by means of appropriate coordination contracts. At the same time, the performance of the supply chain is also improved. The range of bargaining strategies of the two parties under different contracts is determined and several important implications are derived analytically to point out relationship among characteristically differ-ent contracts. Results are illustrated with numerical examples.

Key words: low-carbon supply chain, sales-rebate contract, carbon tax, supply chain coordination, game theory